Kappajot: Moral Minds II

Having finished the first section of Moral Minds by Hauser, I want to take a moment and go over the basic thesis of the book and the philosophy that he's operating under.

In terms of morality, his proposition basically boils down to an argument for a "moral organ" or Moral Grammar that exists as part and parcel of the human condition. He is basically attempting to apply Noam Chomsky's theory of Language to Morality (that humans are born not as blank slate creatures, but with an "innate grammar" or instinct towards language that is then molded to the specific cultural language they are born into). For, Hauser, then, emotions like disgust, guilt, and moral pride are indicative of subconscious moral judgements that we all make on the spot and then justify post-hoc and apply to the particulars of whatever dilemma is being experienced. Morality, then, is not merely a cultural institution, nor is it an abstract ideal. It is an innate universal grammar exists as the bones of Ethical decision making to be fleshed out by the cultural context an individual is born into.

The first section focuses primarily on briefly sketching out the ethical schools of thought that he sees as relevant to his investigation of morality. He begins by contrasting Hume with Kant and then arriving at Rawls as the ethical paradigm that he feels best describes how we experience moral dilemmas and arrive at moral judgements, decisions, or actions.

The simplified versions of these three philosophies are as follows:

Kantian Creature: Moral Dilemma ---> Logical Evaluation ---> Moral Judgement
Humean Creature: Moral Dilemma ---> Empathetic Emotional Reaction ---> Moral Judgement ---> post-hoc Logical Justification
Rawlsian Creature: Moral Dilemma ---> Moral Judgement ---> Emotional Reaction/Logical Evaluation

For Hauser, the Rawlsian creature is most indicative of our experiences of moral decision making. As an example, we can logically justify why torturing a baby for sport is wrong (Kantian), we can also make the claim that torturing the baby is wrong because it feels wrong (Hume), but in both cases the emotion and the logical justification are not indicative of moral good, but a result of subconscious processes that dictate moral reasoning (Rawls). Good and bad, it seems, exist within us and influence our decision making on a very basic level.

As evidence for his position he cites the consistent emotional justification required to operate within a Kantian system (as a rule of thumb, people will follow rules of utility when asked to evaluate an ethical situation rationally, but will still experience moral disgust as a result of those actions. Or, to put it another way, Sophie's choice may be the only thing she morally able to do according to the rules of utility and rational ethics, but that doesn't assuage the sense of moral disgust and guilt she will carry with her.) Humean, ethics, Hauser believes, similarly misses the mark by placing too much weight on the moral emotions themselves. While emotions like disgust, guilt, and pride are indicative of the moral weight behind a choice, to use these emotions as a source of morality is to stray into a dangerous realm of absolute relativism. That empathy should be chosen as the preferred emotion behind what makes an action morally significant seems a bit arbitrary (why not selfish emotions? or what about instances of conflicting moral feelings?)

Possible objections as we move forward:

Placing the entire system of moral operation under the "veil of mystery."
Crowd dynamics, or how crowds overwhelm the moral implications of actions.
How does one determine the "Moral Grammar?"
Is the moral grammar objective? How do we claim it is objective if it "exists within us?"

All this and more as we continue to press forward. Expect relevant edits as I review the first chapter.